2000. While Cameron (2000) makes the case that blame-game politics are anomalous for the period he studies, 1 such a contention does not fit the context of presidential-congressional relations in the 104th Congress particularly well. While neither the GOP congressional majority nor Clinton necessarily set out to engage in high-stakes, blame-game politics, political considerations-particularly electoral motivations-pushed both sides toward such a strategy when budget negotiations produced stalemate. The unique context of executive-legislative conflict from 1995-96, I argue, laid the groundwork for a return to "normal" modes of bargaining in Clinton's second term which comport better with the assumptions of the coordination model.
The analysis is organized in four parts. The first section places Clinton's legislative presidency into comparative context to accentuate how voting coalitions in Congress buttressed the foundation for a successful veto strategy. The second section briefly reviews the tenets and shortcomings of formal models in the evaluation of veto threats and legislative outcomes, and elaborates the conditions under which blame-game scenarios between the president and the congressional majority are likely to materialize. The third section presents a twin-pronged empirical analysis of Clinton's veto threats that melds quantitative and qualitative approaches.
Using the entire body of Clinton's public veto threats for legislation that passed and failed, legislative outcomes are systematically arrayed along the president's preference continuum under blame-game and coordination model scenarios. Secondary, qualitative analysis of select bill histories confirms the utility of a multiple perspectives approach in modeling veto politics from 1995-2000. The concluding section offers some final thoughts about veto politics and alternative conceptualizations of presidential success.
CLINTON AND THE REPUBLICAN CONGRESS: VETO THREATS VERSUS COALITION-BUILDING
From a comparative viewpoint, Clinton's strategic position under divided government was unique in several regards. Party-unity voting and a more centralized setting in Congress robbed him of opportunities to forge the cross-party coalitions that were frequent in the "pre-reform" era (pre-1973) for Republican presidents like Eisenhower and even Nixon. In earlier eras moderates in both parties often held the balance of power over legislative outcomes (Bond and Fleisher 1990; . 2 Presidents who faced an opposition majority in Congress had more opportunities to cobble together cross-party support for their policy positions, prevail on floor votes, and avoid extensive reliance on vetoes and veto threats. At the same time, in an environment of shifting legislative alliances presidents had to worry about successful overrides of their vetoes. This environment provided greater opportunities for presidents to avoid extensive reliance on the veto power.
Clinton's legislative travails are borne out in Figure 1 , which shows that cross-party support reached a nadir in 1995 when Republicans supported the president's positions, on average, only 22 percent of the time. Unable to reach across the aisle to build winning coalitions, Clinton's success rate on floor votes from 1995-2000 was among the lowest for presidents who have faced divided government in the post-War era according to Congressional Quarterly's yearly tabulations (Congressional Quarterly Almanacs 1995 . Clinton opposed over twothirds of the bills that reached the floor. Democrats stood firmly behind Clinton more than threequarters of the time across his two terms.
[ Figure 1 ]
The central point of Figure is that the stability of voting coalitions in Congress in the 104th-106th Congresses and the House Republican leadership's tight grip on floor proceedings dashed Clinton's hope of any considerable advances of his preferred agenda carrying over from the 103rd Congress. But strong partisan support did shore up his ability to influence the policy process and policy outcomes, either by halting the GOP agenda with applied vetoes, or redefining available solutions with implied vetoes-threats-as a means of bringing policy outcomes closer to his own preferences. Clinton's reactionary and sometimes preemptive form of legislative leadership through veto leverage must be understood as a strategic response to the particular context of divided government that Clinton confronted. "Often the purpose of a veto threat," Sinclair (2000, 145) notes, "is not to kill the legislation, but to extract concessions from an opposition majority that has major policy differences with the president but lacks the strength to override his vetoes."
Party-unity gave Clinton an advantage in the veto power that Harry Truman, the only other post-War Democratic president to face a Republican Congress, sorely lacked. Truman, like
Clinton, faced a confident Republican majority following mid-term elections that reversed partisan control of Congress and were widely viewed as discrediting the president's policies. However, the union of Republicans and southern Democrats (the conservative coalition) gave the congressional majority of the 80th Congress a veto-proof policy majority that could trump Truman's vetoes in a way that was not possible under Clinton's watch because of Democratic unity (Conley 2000) .
Voting alignments in Congress from 1995-2000 would have seemingly forced the Republican majority to take the mere threat of a presidential veto seriously. Narrow seat margins and party-unity voting all but assured that challenges to Clinton's vetoes would end in failure.
But we are left with several empirical puzzles. In the 104th Congress Republican leaders often ignored Clinton's veto threats. Why did they provoke the president to veto legislation and attempt doomed overrides? Did they believe Clinton was bluffing, or were they playing an electoral "blame game" rather than a legislative "policy" game after budget negotiations failed?
And how did the executive-legislative showdown over the budget in late 1995 and early 1996 persuade the Republican leadership to take a more judicious response to Clinton's veto threats in his second term? The next section reviews competing theories about presidential veto threats and melds perspectives on "blame-game" and "coordination" models of veto threats to understand Clinton's strategy and success across his two terms.
MODELING VETOES AND VETO THREATS TO EVALUATE PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESS
Scholars have posited two competing frameworks to account for veto threats' force of influence: the "commitment" and "coordination" models. The commitment model suggests that the effectiveness of veto threats turns on the president's public pledges. "The effect of political rhetoric," Charles Cameron (2000, 196) posits, "is to constrain the speaker so he can't retreat from his position without paying a steep price." Reneging on a promise might entail electoral retaliation, sully the president's reputation in Congress, or cost him in the court of public opinion.
George Bush's 1990 volte-face on his "read my lips, no new taxes" promise of the 1988 campaign, and conservatives' ire in Congress and in the electorate, places into sharp relief the dangers of backtracking on a public veto commitment (see Eastland 1992) . Ingberman and Yao (1991) contend that going public with a commitment to veto legislation also gives presidents some level of proposal power by indicating to Congress which provisions a bill must or must not contain to earn his approval. Bill Clinton utilized just such a type of threat on his health care reform proposal during his 1994 State of the Union Address by pledging to veto any bill that did not guarantee universal coverage (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1/25/94, 153) . Presidents may also turn to a bluffing strategy and threaten to veto bills they might otherwise accept to gain a strategic edge over Congress and bring outcomes closer to their preferences (see McCarty 1997) .
Despite appealing intuitive elements, the commitment model suffers from several empirical difficulties. The formal model forecasts that presidents will make good on their veto threat unless
Congress yields completely to their demands. However, more than half of the threatened bills that passed according to Cameron's (2000) cataloguing of public threats were not vetoed when Congress failed to comply fully. Clearly, presidents do not veto all legislation when Congress concedes to some, but not all, of their stipulations. The model also predicts that Congress will successfully override the president's veto, but Congress actually fails to do so fourth-fifths of the time (Cameron 2000, 197) .
The Coordination Model
The coordination model is an alternative approach for understanding the impact of public veto threats on inter-branch bargaining. The spatial model assumes that the president and Congress are interested in substantive policy outcomes. The model was developed by Matthews (1989) with the central premise that Congress has incomplete information on which bills the president may prefer to the status quo. Cameron (2000, 181-82) emphasizes that "if the president's veto threat is to have any effect on the legislature, Congress must be somewhat unsure about what policies the president will accept." The supposition is that Congress does not know whether the president is an accommodator, who will accept the majority's ideal point, or whether he is a compromiser with whom the majority must negotiate. If Congress knows that the president will ultimately accept the policies it passes, veto threats have no basis for influence and are simply "cheap talk."
If, however, Congress is uncertain about what the president will accept, legislators will meet the president's demands as far as they deem necessary to circumvent a veto. The key to the power of the president's veto is his "policy reputation" in Congress, which bolsters the sincerity of the threat. Matthews and Cameron argue that the president's rhetoric gives legislators an estimation of his position as an accommodator or a compromiser. In other words the president's public statements indicate to members of Congress how extensively they must revise legislation to meet his approval. The president may choose to object publicly to many more legislative provisions than he actually opposes in order to maximize potential concessions. Alternatively, he may emphatically object to only select language in bills, as Clinton did repeatedly on abortion issues from 1995-2000. The idea is that the president's rhetoric signals important, if imperfect, information to legislative leaders, who will in turn offer the most favorable compromise to accommodate the president's demands and get priority legislation passed.
The advantage of the coordination model, as Cameron (2000) shows, is that it explains executive-legislative compromise better than the commitment model. The model provides a basis for understanding why presidents are typically not compelled to actually apply vetoes to threatened legislation. In addition, a structure of stable voting coalitions works in tandem with the assumptions of the coordination model in terms of the president's policy reputation. Intraparty cohesion and narrow party-margins in Congress bolster the president's ability to make good on veto threats if Congress does not comply at least partially with his demands since override attempts will most likely be thwarted. Finally, the model also explains why some veto threats appear ineffectual. Because presidents' public threats naturally convey their preferences with some ambiguity, sometimes legislative leaders underestimate the president's minimal acceptance point and unintentionally provoke a veto.
Shortcomings of the Coordination Model: Electoral Motivations and Blame-Game Politics
It is nevertheless possible that the congressional majority intentionally sets out to trigger a presidential veto and/or attempts an abortive override vote to call attention to inter-branch conflict. Similarly, the president may purposefully veto legislation to build a case in the public arena against the congressional majority under divided government. With a focus on substantive aspects of legislation and presidential-congressional negotiation, the coordination model encounters some difficulty with such "blame-game" scenarios.
From the congressional standpoint, the majority's denial of the president's objections as articulated through a veto threat is neither a misreading of his policy position nor a loss of credibility in his policy reputation. Rather, in this "position-taking game" the congressional majority perceives some electoral or constituency benefits inhering in either provoking a veto and/or attempting an override that outweighs the potential cost of a probable loss (Conley and Kreppel 2001) . Under structural conditions similar to those of the 104th-106th Congresses an examination of passage coalitions on legislation would inform majority leaders that an override following a vote along strict party lines would, in all likelihood, fail. Yet they risk the override anyway because their goal is not to change the legislative outcome, but to blame the president for obstruction of their agenda, garner public sympathy, and posture for the next round of interbranch negotiations-or the next election. The veto override attempt in this context becomes the pivot point for in the blame-game.
The president may also engage in the blame-game and veto legislation to make a larger point in the public eye. Presidents Ford and Reagan, for example, vetoed budget legislation with bipartisan support to chastise Congress for its spending habits, and they faced successful overrides. Clinton, as will be shown, vetoed what is typically the least controversial of appropriations bills-legislative appropriations-to gain leverage over Republicans in the 104th
Congress. In these cases it is clear that other presidential motivations trumped policy considerations. Blocking legislation or having their vetoes overridden enabled presidents to "have" the issue and build a case against Congress.
Blame-game politics surrounding vetoes and veto threats may be understood as an extreme form of "going public" (Kernell 1997) In the 104th Congress GOP leaders attempted to use appropriations bills as leverage against Clinton for the adoption of their agenda-much of which was eventually contained in the budget reconciliation bill. Refusing to modify legislation in the face of Clinton's veto threats, they provoked vetoes and selectively attempted overrides they knew had no chance of success based on the structure of the bills' original passage coalition. They hoped to call the president's bluff by forcing a government shutdown and forging a public backlash against him after negotiations failed.
While it may be argued that the GOP leadership was playing a "multiple bill" game-that is, holding hostage a host of appropriations bills early in the 104th Congress to gain influence over provisions in the reconciliation legislation-the fact remains that the Republican majority continued to provoke vetoes and attempted doomed overrides well after Clinton refused to budge on their fiscal priorities and had vetoed the reconciliation legislation. Moreover, the Republican leadership pursued overrides on non-budgetary bills vetoed by Clinton, such as abortion legislation, to posture for the 1996 elections. At this juncture spatial analysis does not explain the GOP's strategy. The "multiple bill" hypothesis forms only part of the overall context. Across substantive issues the legislative or "policy game" was trumped by the political dimensions of the blame-game as Clinton and the GOP faced the 1996 elections in less than eleven months.
Electoral motivations pushed the Republicans to attempt to build a public case against Clinton and blame him for policy stalemate.
The centrality of blame game politics in Clinton's early experience under divided government emphasizes the importance of a multifaceted approach in the evaluation of presidential "success" on veto threats. In the coordination game, presidents attempt to get the majority to capitulate to their policy demands, or at a minimum, gain some level of compromiseand the congressional majority would rather choose concessions over no legislation.
Alternatively, in the blame-game scenario the politics of brinksmanship may supplant "normal" preferences for policy compromise. The congressional majority may provoke vetoes and/or attempt overrides in the bid to embarrass the president in the public arena. The president may also prefer to veto legislation to build a case against the majority. What becomes paramount is each player's relative confidence in winning the public relations duel.
Understanding Clinton's Strategy: A Multi-Stage Approach
Clinton's veto threat strategy is best understood by approaching executive-legislative relations through the lens of the "blame-game" in the 104th Congress and the legislative "coordination game" in the 105th-106th Congresses. The models can be tested with empirical data by evaluating legislative outcomes and arraying the president's hypothetical outcome preferences in each scenario.
[ Figure 2 ] Figure 2 presents a decision-tree on potential legislative outcomes following a veto threat.
Of course, these preference orderings are not absolutes. The decision tree is a heuristic. The preference continuums are meant to cast light on the relative success of veto threats under different assumptions about the type of game in which the congressional majority and the president was engaged.
In the legislative or "policy" game, according to the coordination model, the order of the president's preferences may be expressed as follows: P0>P1?P2?C4>C6>C8=C10>P4>C9>C11.
The primary objective of the president's veto threat is to get Congress to capitulate, kill the bill, 3 or obtain substantial policy concessions. Clearly, the president would prefer that the majority acquiesce entirely to his demands (P0). Having the bill tabled in committee, killed by a floor vote, or passed in one chamber but never taken up in the other chamber (P1) is potentially equivalent to a compromise (P2), depending on the scope of the concessions the president must make in such a compromise. At the same time, lthough the president may be successful in halting the bill based on his particular objections, provisions he might otherwise support also do not pass.
In such a "legislative game," congressional capitulation, failure of the bill, or inter-branch compromise following a veto threat are all favorable to casting a veto with the risk that it might be challenged. However, failed override attempts following compromise that does not go far enough to satisfy the president's demands (C4) or the majority's outright denial of the president's objections (C8) are nonetheless preferable to accepting the bill (P4). Obviously, any successful override following a compromise shunned by the president (C9) or the majority's decision to reject any recognition of the president's concerns (C11) is the least preferable outcome.
The president's preference order may take quite a different shape if he recognizes that the congressional majority is playing a different game-or chooses to engage in the blame-game himself. In Figure 2 the blame-game path is represented by the upper portion of the diagram, beginning with C3, or the majority's decision to deny the president's objections in the bill. Under this scenario in which the congressional majority's interest is in building public or electoral support, the president's preference order may be expressed as follows:
C10?C6>C8?C4>P0>P1>P2>P4>C9=C11. Vetoes and/or failed override attempts that bring inter-branch policy disputes into the media spotlight may, in fact, be favorable to unchallenged vetoes, congressional capitulation, or compromise.
Under circumstances of intense partisan disagreement, the blame-game can enhance the president's policy reputation and negotiating position. A skillful president can use the power of the bully pulpit and his veto message to lay out for the public his rationale for returning legislation to Congress and portray himself as a conciliator. When the congressional majority triggers a veto or attempts an override to marshal public sympathy and build electoral support (or the president vetoes legislation to make a public case) the burden shifts to leaders on Capitol Hill who must explain their logic for denying the president's objections. There is some evidence that public esteem for Congress falls when leaders challenge the president (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997) . They may find themselves at a relative disadvantage to the president because they do not command the same level of media attention or resources to make their case to the public. Table 1 presents legislative outcomes across the three periods in cross-tabular format.
Veto Threats and Legislative Outcomes Under Competing Assumptions
The arrangement of outcomes follows straightforwardly the paths in Figure 2 : Congressional yielding to the president's objections (C1), inter-branch compromise (C2), or congressional denial of the president's objections (C3).
[ Table 1 ]
These data underscore how the GOP majority and Clinton appeared to be engaged in different types of games from 1995-96 and from 1997-2000. While Congress rarely capitulated fully to the president's objections, veto threats often resulted in the failure of bills (P1)-but more frequently after 1996. The failure of bills increased significantly from the 104th Congress (36.6%) to almost half in the 105th Congress and remained above 40% for the 106th Congress. In these cases the bills failed in committee or on the floor, or were passed by one chamber and never taken up in the other. The increased inability of the majority to present enrolled bills to the president appears in part due to a declining willingness to challenge Clinton's veto threats.
This assertion is born out by examining the blame-game (deny) path in Table 1 . The GOP majority ignored Clinton's objections on a quarter of all threatened legislation in the 104th
Congress and provoked ten vetoes (C6, C10). Moreover, the Republican majority brought five of the ten vetoed bills up for overrides that failed (C10). What is similarly telling is that the percentage of threatened bills that yielded compromise and were accepted by the president (P2)
doubled from the 104th to the 105th Congresses. Finally, after 1996 the GOP majority was largely disinclined to challenge Clinton's vetoes when the leadership denied his legislative objections. The Republican majority challenged the president's veto only once in the 105th/106th
Congresses. These data suggest the degree to which inter-branch bargaining dynamics substantively changed across the three congressional periods.
[Figures 3 and 4]
These same data may be arrayed according to the president's hypothetical preference outcomes under blame-game and coordination model assumptions. Figure 3 suggests that if
Clinton recognized and engaged the majority's blame-game politics in the 104th Congress, the vetoes cast after denials of his objections and the failed override attempts could work to his advantage. By contrast, Figure 4 suggests that under coordination model assumptions Clinton could boast his ability to halt objectionable legislation (P1). And on compromise legislation, he was most successful in thwarting Republican "policy riders" with which he disagreed on appropriations and other substantive bills. The more frequent compromises struck on legislation passed from 1997-2000 (P2) gave both Clinton and the GOP majority a basis for credit-claiming.
How did Clinton successfully manage strategic disagreement in the 104th Congress, and how did those dynamics shape executive-legislative relations through the veto power after his reelection in 1996? The next sub-section examines more closely the risky politics of the public blame-game in the 104th Congress and the longer-term consequences for presidentialcongressional relations in Clinton's second term.
Round One: Veto Threats in the 104th Congress and the Politics of Public Posturing
The federal budget dominated presidential-congressional attention from 1995-96 and the GOP's Contract with America became the focal point of inter-branch conflict. The congressional majority sought to curb governmental spending, cut or eliminate a host of domestic and foreign programs, and reduce regulatory burdens on the private sector. In the public contest between the branches Clinton deftly outmaneuvered the majority, making good on his veto pledges and staging a coordinated effort with congressional Democrats to variably beat back and moderate the GOP agenda.
Budget issues pitted the White House and the Republicans on Capitol Hill against one another in an acute public relations battle. To return to Figure 3 momentarily, in the relatively rare cases in which inter-branch compromise emerged (P2) or the majority capitulated to the president's objections (P0), it was typically on spending issues with less symbolism attached to them and other minor elements of the GOP agenda. 4 Only once was the Republican-led Congress able to override Clinton's veto in six years (C9). The successful override on the issue of shareholder lawsuits turned out to be quite atypical, as Clinton vetoed the bipartisan bill on technical issues that Democrats believed they had resolved to the president's satisfaction. HR 1158 marked Clinton's first attempt to re-frame the public debate over the GOP agenda through the veto power. To some observers, the president's threat to nix the bill appeared contrived. Clinton accused the majority of forsaking critical domestic programs in favor of pet constituency projects, even though he had favored some of those very projects in the past (Schneider 1995) . He forcefully opposed the measure and publicly criticized GOP leaders,
forewarning that "I believe a bill that cuts education to put in pork is the wrong way to balance the budget, and I will veto it" . While Speaker Gingrich and the Republicans tried to convince the nation they were making good on their electoral promise of smaller government, Clinton and Democrats endeavored to use the supplemental appropriations legislation as an exemplar for other bills they hoped to denounce as fiscally "reckless" or socially "irresponsible."
The dynamics of Clinton's eventual veto of HR 1158-the first veto of his presidency- in the legislative process vis-à-vis the GOP agenda (Mitchell 1995) . And he proved he could "make it stick by commanding enough votes not to be overridden by Congress" (Cloud 1995) .
Republicans faced an overwhelming deficit of votes for a successful override. Second, the GOP majority invoked electoral promises linked to the Contract as a justification for ignoring the president's objections. House leaders wagered that the public would view their resolve in favorable terms and reprove Clinton for adhering to the status quo and holding up their agenda.
The president, however, carefully crafted his veto message to garner public sympathy. He sought to portray himself as a centrist willing to negotiate with a congressional majority that had shunned compromise. In the case of the supplemental appropriations bill, he emphasized disagreement "over priorities" and not over the basic goal of reduction of the budget deficit. He then outlined changes suggested by the administration to win his signature (Public Papers of the President 6/7/95, 828-29).
The legislative appropriations bill, HR 1854, brought inter-branch conflict over the budget closer to a climax as the president postured to gain as much leverage as possible over upcoming spending bills-and played a preemptive blame game. In this singular case, the bill had not been passed along party-lines, and the president's objection to the measure was not due to specific provisions. Clinton did not oppose the nearly 9 percent reduction in congressional outlays.
Instead he sought to portray the Republicans as irresponsible for prioritizing congressional appropriations over other pending domestic appropriations bills. He also wanted to convince GOP leaders that he would not be "blackmailed" over the federal budget in the wake of his decision to sign a continuing resolution. That temporary spending measure, enacted in late September, warded off furloughs of government employees and bought time for him and Speaker
Gingrich to reconcile policy differences over the budget (Harris and Yang 1995) . Clinton is still for more spending and more government" (Salant 1995a ). In reality, the veto of HR 1854 was not about spending levels or internal reforms in Congress. The significance of the veto was far more symbolic than substantive, as Congress was expected to re-pass the bill in the same form after completing work on the other appropriations bills. Clinton's strategy was to wage a rhetorical campaign against the GOP agenda and to strengthen his strategic position on pending budget negotiations.
Blame-game politics between the branches intensified by December 1995 as Congress was pressed to adopt yet another temporary funding bill to keep portions of the government in operation. Disagreement between the White House and Capitol Hill over the federal budget pivoted on the reconciliation bill (HR 2491). Clinton objected to a panoply of provisions, from dramatic reductions in Medicare and Medicaid and education spending to the scope of tax cuts and environmental issues. Democrats, as minority whip David Bonior of Michigan emphasized, wanted Clinton to "stand firm" in his opposition to the Republican agenda. The president's veto threat emboldened their resolve to take issue publicly with proposed cuts to programs dear to traditional Democratic constituencies (Hager 1995) . Indeed, the reconciliation measure comprised many elements at the heart of the GOP's Contract agenda from which the majority was loathe to back away, including components of welfare reform, trimming the regulatory scope of the federal government, and a balanced budget within seven years (Pear 1995; Kamen 1995) . For months Speaker Gingrich insisted that he would hold other spending bills hostage to the president's acceptance of a balanced budget (Pianin and Harris 1995) . By framing the debate in these terms, Gingrich, Clinton, and congressional Democrats all but assured a dramatic confrontation between the branches.
In the days leading up the veto of the reconciliation bill on December 6, 1995 it appeared, albeit for a fleeting moment, that the White House and the GOP majority were not far from reaching an accord. The Republicans offered to restore $4 billion in spending, Clinton insisted on $8 billion, and the two sides were drawing closer to a mid-point both might accept. However, White House leaks of a "deal" to separate out the reconciliation bill from other pending appropriations measures may have killed a compromise. Gingrich emphatically denied that the reconciliation and other spending bills could be divorced, dismissed such rumors as "spin," and reaffirmed his opposition to signing on to any further temporary spending measures to keep elements of the government in operation, the president's acceptance of a balanced budget notwithstanding (Hager 1995a ).
Clinton's veto of HR 2491 became embroiled in the politics of high rhetoric and symbolism on both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue. For his part, the president accented that the veto was consistent with his long-standing threats the majority chose to ignore (Purdum 1995) .
The White House, over the period of several months, publicly registered the view that "The
Republican budget plan fails to protect Medicare, Medicaid, education, the environment and tax fairness," and pledged a veto (Gray 1995) . In returning the bill to Congress, Clinton symbolically Mr. Clinton framed his disagreements with the Republicans as a battle over fundamental American 'values,' using that word an even dozen times in his brief speech and accusing the Republicans of seeking to 'undermine' or 'violate our values,' while vowing to 'elevate,' 'protect' and 'honor' them himself. At the same time, the White House took pains to describe Mr. Clinton's proposal as a gesture of good faith to the Republicans, one that will take the sketchy 10-year plan for balancing the budget that the President had offered earlier and condense it, with more detail, into the time frame the Republicans demanded. (Purdum 1995) .
With the president's veto pen in mind, Speaker Gingrich accused him of "campaign gimmickry"
and tried to cast Clinton as a defender of the status quo uninterested in a balanced budget. He inveighed that "the president needs to recognize that Lyndon Johnson's Great Society has failed.
The people know that a Washington-based, Washington-spending, Washington bureaucracy, Washington red-tape Great Society isn't the answer" (Devroy and Pianin 1995) . but the President vetoed them. We are here once again attempting to send these people back to work" (Gray 1996) . Republicans complained that the administration had been unwilling to negotiate compromises, yet they had retained the most objectionable provisions Clinton cited in his public threats. For example, the president took particular issue with Republican plans to replace his "cops-on-the-beat" program with a block grant in the Commerce, State, Justice bill (Idelson 1995) . Similarly, on the defense measure the GOP kept restrictions on the president's authority to deploy troops for peacekeeping missions and retained plans for an anti-ballistic missile system that Clinton argued would violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty with Russia. Republicans used the override attempt to contend that the president vetoed the measure "because he wants neither the missile defense nor an adequate defense authorization bill" (Washington Post 1996).
The high-stakes tactics employed by Gingrich and GOP House leaders backfired with the unanticipated loss of public support. By early January 1996 it became clear that the public was beginning to ascribe far greater blame to the Congress than to the president for the policy confrontation and stalemate. The warning signs of the thin ice on which the GOP was treading were evident at the time of the initial showdown over the reconciliation bill in October of 1995.
A NBC/New York Times national poll found that 10 percent or more respondents opposed the Republican agenda than supported it (Clymer 1995) . The downward trend in public esteem for the GOP deepened as the budget confrontation unfolded. A CBS News survey released in early January 1996 uncovered that 44 percent of the public blamed Republicans for the government shutdown, while only 33 held President Clinton responsible (Clymer 1996) . And throughout the budget imbroglio and beyond, Clinton's favorability rating typically led Gingrich's by twenty into a forum to portray the GOP agenda as "extreme" and reinvent himself as a centrist whose goal was to "save" popular programs such as Social Security and Medicare.
The GOP leadership had also underestimated the potential effect of negative press coverage of the government shutdown and the inherent media advantages possessed by the White House. As the budget impasse affected routine governmental services that voters generally take for granted-from access to national parks to the receipt of Social Security checks-a growing public backlash, well-documented by the television and print media, left the GOP in a quagmire.
The Republican leadership also faced another dilemma. If the public views congressional challenges to the president with some skepticism (Durr, Gilmour, and Wolbrecht 1997) , the "public speakership" and a fragmented congressional leadership necessarily have a difficult time competing with the vast resources of the "public presidency." As the focal point of media attention the presidency commands far more attention than the Speaker of the House or majority leaders. These factors combined to strengthen Clinton's strategic position in the public arena.
The coup de grâce to the Republicans' strategic standoff with Clinton arguably came with the president's veto of welfare reform (HR 4) in early January 1996. The majority sent Clinton yet another measure that he had long threatened to veto, and in doing so in the midst of the budget crisis, provided the president with a critical opportunity to make the rhetorical case that the Republicans were again promoting "irresponsible policies." Like the vetoed spending measures, the welfare reform bill had passed along party lines with no chance of a successful override. Republicans accused Clinton of reneging on his 1992 campaign promise to "end welfare as we know it" and tried to make an issue of the president's veto of the legislation late in the evening. Senate majority leader Bob Dole contended that "The president may have tried to hide this 'stealth veto' by doing it late at night, but he can not hide the message he is sending to the American people…He will stand in the way of fundamental change and, instead, will fight for the status quo" (Havemann and Dewar 1996) .
As early as his 1995 State of the Union Address Clinton tried to preempt the Republican welfare agenda by indicating in general terms that he would take a stand against any reform proposal that would "punish poverty" (Katz 1995) . The president did hedge on the specifics of what he would and would not accept in a welfare reform package to avoid enabling the Republicans to craft a bill that he would be forced to veto (Cloud 1995) . But the partisan nature of the eventual passage of HR 4 provided him with substantial political cover. A veto decision was a foregone conclusion after a House-Senate conference on the bill, dominated by conservative Republicans, won not a single Democratic signature (Pear 1995a) . Clinton attempted to avoid the recriminations of Dole and Gingrich that he had reneged on his 1992 campaign pledge by emphasizing the need to fashion a bipartisan approach to welfare reform, even if he was short on specifics. The president took his case to the public, claiming that the Republican bill would be "tough on children," and would do "too little to move people from welfare to work" (see Pear 1996) .
Congressional Republicans provoked two more vetoes following threats issued by Clinton after the government shutdown. The vetoes and override attempts of product liability and partialbirth abortion legislation were on discretionary domestic issues, which, unlike appropriations, did not face a "must pass" situation. But they had potential electoral value. Inter-branch conflict was aimed at shoring up support in the conservative base of the GOP for the 1996 elections (Harris 1996) . On the abortion issue, for example, conservative Republicans were unwilling to compromise with Clinton over the wording of legislation. They managed to garner enough support in the House to override the president, but failed in the Senate. Conservatives took a longer term view that Clinton's veto would prove unpopular and wanted public momentum against the procedure to build (Goodstein 1996) .
Clinton was ultimately able to earn compromise on the budget, beat back important elements of the GOP agenda, and push the Republicans further to his own ideal point because he recognized early the type of legislative game in which the congressional majority was engaged from 1995-96. In the 104th Congress executive-legislative relations did not take resemble the typical bargaining situation proposed by the coordination model. Rather, inter-branch relations became a poker match with public support or condemnation for the government shutdown the product of a winning hand. Clinton had several "aces in the hole" that the congressional majority did not anticipate. Strong Democratic support enabled the president to make good on his policy commitments and stave off overrides when Republicans attempted to call his bluff on veto threats.
His trump card turned out to be the ability to use the rhetorical presidency to garner public sympathy, reassign blame to the GOP majority for uncompromising policy positions, and recapture important elements of the terms of debate, even if the Republican agenda supplanted his own carryover agenda of the 103rd Congress. Clinton's willingness to make good on his veto threats solidified his policy reputation in Congress and convinced GOP leaders to reassess how they would respond to his veto threats in his second term.
Round Two: Veto Threats as "Normal Politics" in Clinton's Second Term
At the outset of the budget crisis in 1995 White House Press Secretary Michael McCurry admitted that "There are big differences between the president and the Congress, and I suspect that those kinds of issues will have to be settled in November of 1996" (Hager 1995a ). But despite a modest seat gain for Democrats in Congress that left Republicans in continued control of both chambers, Clinton's reelection seemed only to reaffirm the status quo. The institutional setting assured that veto threats would remain a powerful tool for the president in the 105th and 106th Congresses.
Policy compromise was, however, more forthcoming over the period 1997-2000.
Presidential-congressional bargaining frequently reflected the assumptions of the coordination model. Republicans carefully selected elements of their agenda on which to challenge the president publicly and were eager to avoid a budgetary crisis. Both the president and the Republican majority showed more willingness to reach common ground on spending levels, and a federal revenue windfall undoubtedly facilitated reconciling Clinton's spending proposals with
Republicans' tax cuts. On other bills, the majority attempted to attach "policy riders" or amendments to bills that the president could otherwise support. Clinton was generally successful in persuading GOP leaders to drop the most exceptionable riders through veto threats or made good on his threats to force re-negotiation.
Clinton issued 102 public veto threats across his second term according to the methodology employed in this analysis. As in the 104th Congress, a plurality of threatened billsabout one in four threatened bills-failed in one or the other chamber (Figure 4, P1) . Many of these bills concerned elements of the GOP agenda that stirred considerable controversy in
Congress and passed the House along party-line votes, never to be taken up by the more moderate Senate. What changed was that inter-branch compromise was much more the norm for The majority of threatened bills on which the Republican majority chose not to compromise and challenge the president was distinguishable by the measures' typically discretionary character, unlike "must pass" appropriations bills that had been the center of controversy in the 104th Congress. Most of the provoked vetoes furnished opportunities for the majority to make policy statements without immediate ramifications in an attempt to build electoral support or offset compromises made in appropriations bills. For example, Republicans were forced to yield to the president on several occasions on education funding levels. They responded to polls showing voter concern over education by touting school choice and education savings accounts to the middle class. By provoking vetoes they sought to distinguish their position from Clinton and the Democrats, who argued that federal subventions should focus solely on public schools and that education savings accounts would benefit only the wealthy. preempted it, and re-tooled it through veto leverage (Conley 2002) . Some scholars have suggested that Clinton was more successful in his manipulation of institutional and electoral politics under divided government than he was in pushing forth an expansive agenda two years earlier when Democrats controlled Congress (see Edwards 2000) .
This analysis has combined theoretical perspectives on presidential veto threats to explain the basis for Clinton's influence over policy outcomes, and why veto threats figured so prominently in executive-legislative relations across his two terms. Strategic disagreement entails risks to both branches of the national government. Nothing guaranteed that Clinton would prevail at the public blame-game in the 104th Congress. The extreme conflict between the branches placed a premium on the president's rhetorical skills and his standing with the public. The president had to make the case to voters that the ameliorated legislation derived far less from his own set of policy objectives than from the opposition majority's agenda. And he faced significant pressures among his own partisans for compromising too much on several occasions. The sharp critiques of Clinton's compromise on the welfare reform bill by select congressional Democrats such as Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Charles Rangel point to a certain irony of divided government. Presidents need to maintain unity among their co-partisans to retain veto leverage as a means of negotiating with the opposition majority. But intense conflict in Congress can also make it more difficult for presidents to find a middle-ground and strike compromises acceptable to their loyal partisans.
In playing the public blame game, the GOP majority satisfied its core electoral 
